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I. INTRODUCTION Pakistan has earned considerable notoriety on the international stage because of its failure to curb violent crimes against women committed in the name of honor.
1 Academic analyses of the state's failure to deter honor killings focus primarily on lacunae in statutory law (especially the Islamized provisions introduced by legislation), while assigning secondary blame to gaps in the criminal justice system, failings of the policing system, and the inherent defects in the workings of the informal tribal or community-based adjudicatory mechanisms. 2 However, most of these studies fail to dissect the perplexing array of Pakistan's laws, 6specially the different punishment regimes and rules concerning pardon that apply to various cate- The term 'honor killing' is generally used to refer to murder by male family members of their female relatives on account of perceived dishonor caused to the family in a number of circumstances, most often when the female relative chooses to marry or divorce of her own accord, is accused of having illicit sexual relations with someone, or even when she has been raped. 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 gories of murder. 3 As such, these studies miss the mark since the main culprit is neither the substantive legal provisions nor the frequently demonized Islamic law provisions, but rather, the superior judiciary of Pakistan which has historically patronized honor killing by consistently exercising all available discretion in sentencing to the benefit of those accused of such crimes.
Although Pakistan's Parliament has now passed an act with the stated aim of deterring murder in the 'name or on the pretext of honor,' 4 the author anticipates that the historical approach of the judiciary towards honor killings will be adhered to, resulting in the continued, relatively lenient treatment of honor killings. Certain ambiguities rooted in the text of the Act appear to encourage the courts to disregard the Act in many cases of honor killings. 5 In order to understand the basis of this prediction, it is important to appreciate the history of the judicial approach towards sentencing and the allegiance to the exculpatory doctrine of grave and sudden provocation in Pakistan, lately in the face of statutory intervention as well as Islamic law doctrines. Part II of this Note shall, therefore, review the historical (pre-1990) approach of Pakistan's courts towards punishment of the accused under Pakistan's Penal Code provisions dating back to British colonial times. Part III shall outline the Islamized provisions that the Qisas and Diyat legislation introduced in 1990 and the approach adopted by Pakistan's courts towards implementing and applying these laws from 1990 until 1995. Part IV shall analyze two important Supreme Court judgments delivered in late 1995 and reported in early 1996, which opened the floodgates for judicial patronage of honor killings. Part V shall analyze the attempt by the legislature in 2004 to withdraw judicial discretion in sentencing for cases of murder in the name of honor, and Part VI shall 3 See Ruane, supra note 1 (presenting a comparatively more informative analysis of Pakistan's Qisas and Diyat laws). However, even this work includes several simplistic or inaccurate statements and fails to identify exactly how honor killings slip through the various cracks in the system, which shall be identified in this article. (2004) , available at http://www.countercurrents.org/ hr-achr291004.htm. However, once again the focus was on the failure to rectify the perceived defects in the Qisas and Diyat laws rather than the weakness of the law in terms of curbing the abuse of judicial discretion in sentencing and thwarting the availability of grave and sudden provocation as a defense.
identify the increasingly visible signs that the Supreme Court is ready to sidestep this legislation, once again, in order to offer patronage to honor killings.
II. PRE-1990 JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SENTENCING IN CASES OF 'GRAVE AND SUDDEN PROVOCATION'
Prior to 1990, Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.) laid down the law governing murder, whereby murder was punishable by death or imprisonment for life at a minimum. However, Section 302 incorporated a number of specific exceptions, the first of which provided that it "is not murder if the offender, while deprived of the power of selfcontrol by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation." A case which fell within this exception was thus reduced to 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' which was punishable under Section 304, Part I, by transportation for life or imprisonment up to ten years, thereby providing substantial discretion to judges in sentencing.
In Kamal v. State, the Supreme Court decided unanimously that both the trial court and the High Court had erred in awarding capital punishment to the accused for murder under Section 302 of the P.P.C. 6 The Supreme Court found that the accused had committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder under grave and sudden provocation when he killed his wife, and, thus, was punishable under Section 304, Part I. Whereas, Salahuddin Ahmed, J. recommended the maximum sentence of imprisonment for life, the other two judges favored a lesser sentence. Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J. noted the defense counsel's observation that the usual "award of sentences in such cases . . .ranged from six months to five years," and sentenced the accused to time already served which was more than five years and "good enough to meet the ends of justice. '7 Dorab Patel, J. referred to several past judgments in which offenders had been given sentences ranging between one and three years, and agreed that the sentence undergone was thus adequate in these circumstances. 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 The above case was followed by Munir Ahmad v. State, where the appellant had killed the suspected paramour of his wife: the deceased had abused him by calling him a pimp and man without honor. 9 The Supreme Court converted his conviction to a crime punishable under Section 304, Part I and sentenced him to imprisonment for the period already undergone by him, that being six years and three months. Likewise, in Shamoon v. State the Supreme Court sentenced the appellant to time already served, having altered his conviction from murder under Section 302 to culpable homicide under Section 304, Part 1.10 Earlier, the Federal Shariat Court had sentenced him to life imprisonment, having relied on his confessional statement that he had killed the deceased, but having disregarded his plea that he had done so upon seeing him in a compromising situation with his wife. The Shariat Court doubted the defense of provocation on the grounds that if he had in fact seen his wife in this condition, she would not have escaped unhurt. 11 The Supreme Court held that if the conviction of an accused is based solely or primarily on his confessional statement, then it must be taken in its entirety. Niamat Ali v. Muhammad Yaqub offers yet another example of the judicial approach under the pre-1990 penal laws of Pakistan concerning grave and sudden provocation. 12 The Supreme Court refused to enhance a sentence of two years given to the appellant for the murder of his wife on the grounds that "the respondent had lost his control on seeing the deceased indulging in immoral activity."'
13
In these and other similar cases, provocation was invariably considered grave when suspicions of sexual impropriety by a man's wife, sister, cousin or mother were raised. However, the defense of provocation was only available if the provocation was sudden and caused the accused to lose self-control. If there had been a cooling-off period and the accused had committed the offence with pre-meditation, then the accused would be liable for murder. 14 However, even in these cases, "killing for honor" was held to deserve mitigated punishment. The main ingredient of Exception I is the deprivation of power of self-control as a result of grave and sudden provocation. Loss of self-control and premeditation are not compatible phenomena... They suspected that the deceased had formed an illicit liaison with [wife of the accused] and was on an amorous visit. If they had killed [the deceased] there and then it could be at best argued that his very presence at night gave sudden and grave provocation. As seen they caught the deceased and tied his hands with a rope and took him away to a distance of nearly 600 yards and killed him in a field. Thereafter they severed the head from the trunk and carried the two parts of dead body further away and buried them at two different places. Having disposed of the dead body they concealed their weapons of offence ... The conduct of the appellants thus showed full meditation rather than deprivation of self-control. 
56
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 provisions of the P.P.C. were null and void for lack of conformity with the injunctions of Islam and ordered the government to replace these with suitable provisions as per the directions of the bench. To comply with the Shariat Court's dictates, the President promulgated the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance of 1990, frequently referred to as the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, which introduced provisions deemed to conform with the injunctions of Islam as elaborated in the judgment. The Qisas and Diyat Ordinance brought forth a new categorization of homicides and hurt, and created provisions allowing for private settlement of these offenses.
17
On the issue of grave and sudden provocation, Justice Taqi Usmani declared in his opinion in Gul Hasan Khan that the Exception I of Section 300 diverged from Islamic precepts:
As per Islamic rulings, provocation, no matter how grave or sudden, cannot by itself reduce the gravity of the offence of murder. Instead, the relevant issue from an Islamic perspective would be that whether the deceased was indulging in such acts which would amount to an offence punishable by death under Islamic law? For example, if a man sees his wife committing adultery, an offence punishable by death under Islamic law, and kills his wife and her paramour in such circumstances, and brings evidence of adultery as per the requisite standard of proof under Islamic law, then he shall indeed be exempt from Qisas (capital punishment in retribution). However, since he should have approached the authorities in such circumstances rather than taking the law in his own hands, he has committed a crime against the 17 The drafters of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) had created two types of distinctions between crimes which were alien to the British Common Law. First, the Cr.P.C. distinguished between compoundable and non-compoundable offences. Compoundable offences may be settled by the parties (offender and victim or his/ her heirs), subject to the approval of the trial court, as if it were a private or civil dispute. Prior to 1990, murder and grievous hurt were non-compoundable. The second distinction was between cognizable (those that are investigated and prosecuted by the state) and non-cognizable offences (which may only be prosecuted by the complainant). Murder was and continues to be a cognizable offence. However, due to the weaknesses of the investigation and public prosecution functions of the state, most prosecutions, even of very serious crimes including murder, are in practice brought by and pursued by the victims or their families. state and may be given any punishment by the state (as tazir).
18
The above-quoted dictum seems to have dramatically raised the bar for claiming a defense in honor killing situations. Presumptively, the accused could only claim an exemption if he brought forth four eyewitnesses of adultery, a near-impossible standard of proof. Further, killing a person caught in the act of fornication, which is sexual intercourse by one who is not presently married or has never previously been married, would never be justified even if four eyewitnesses were forthcoming since only adultery is punishable by death under Islamic law. 1 9 This enabled Justice Nasim Hasan Shah, member of the bench in Gul Hasan Khan, to conclude in State v. Abdul Waheed that after the Islamization of the concerned laws, the defense of grave and sudden provocation was not available to the accused when he killed the deceased upon seeing him in a compromising situation with his sister while in the presence of two eyewitnesses:
The observations made in Gul Hasan's case clearly show that grave and sudden provocation is not an exemption per se and the punishment of Qisas [death as retribution] where Qatl-i-Amd [intentional murder] is committed under grave and sudden provocation, can be mitigated only if proof of Zina [adultery] is produced, which confirms to the required standard of evidence prescribed under Islamic injunctions. 20 Hence, the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance excluded all exceptions including grave and sudden provocation, sudden fight, and exceeding the right of private defense from Section 300. However, it would be incorrect to state that these Islamized criminal provisions excluded the possibility of leniency for honor killing on account of the exclusion of the defense of grave and sudden provocation. In the aftermath of Gul Hasan Khan, murder was re-classified into four separate sub-categories: A careful analysis of the above categorization of murder reveals numerous gaps, allowing for the lenient treatment of honor killings. First, in an honor killing scenario, the offender may conveniently confess before the court, thereby making his offense one of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas. As such, any one of his family members may pardon him and save him from capital punishment. For example, if B (brother) commits honor killing of S (his sister), then either one of his parents, who are also heirs of the victim, may waive qisas. Although the court could still award imprisonment for up to fourteen years as tazir, in an overwhelming majority of cases, trial as well as appellate courts adhered to the pre-1990 approach by deeming such cases as falling outside the definition of fasad-fil-arz. Second, in cases where the offender committed murder of either his daughter or his wife, and had surviving children, the case would fall under Section 308 and was punishable by imprisonment for up to fourteen years at the discretion of the judge. 3 2 Again, in such cases, judges have consistently imposed lenient sentences.
A majority of murder cases, however, fall under the category of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir. This is especially true when the offender has not only killed his family member but has also killed his or her suspected paramour. From 1990 to 1995, the offender was in a bind as far as making a strategic pick of the sub-categories of Qatl-i-Amd. If he confessed to the murder, he may have received a pardon from his own family, but would very likely have suffered capital punishment as qisas if the male victim's family insisted on it. On the other hand, if the accused did not confess and was instead convicted under Section 302(b), he would receive a minimum punishment of life imprisonment. 33 Yet, if the offender was rich or influential within the community, as was the case in many instances, the offender could safely bet on the courts accepting a compounding of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas or a compromise of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir, without much scrutiny even if such a settlement had not been freely negotiated. . sentencing him to death is so serious that had the petitioner eventually been hanged to death . it would have amounted to murder through judicial process." 33 In fact, grave and sudden provocation was frequently used as a mitigating factor in cases of Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir, used by the courts to avoid inflicting the "normal' sentence of capital punishment.
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IV. OPENING THE FLOODGATES OF PROVOCATION: JUDICIAL PATRONAGE OF HONOR KILLINGS
In 1995, having struggled for years with its inability to show leniency for grave and sudden provocation in the face of a contrarian statutory scheme and a weighty opinion on Islamic law, the Supreme Court of Pakistan finally yielded. 34 The plea of diminished liability in respect of offences relating to human body committed under grave and sudden provocation has been well recognized in the sub-continent for more than a hundred years. There is a good reason for that: a person who commits culpable homicide out of compulsions, ethical or otherwise, not brought about by himself, cannot in the matter of punishment be placed on the same footing as a cold-blooded murderer or a hired assassin. A serious question for consideration arises whether the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, was intended to do away with the preferential treatment that had always been accorded to a person who took another person's life under circumstances where he had lost all self-control. The question is of a great fundamental importance not only for the reason that it will affect a large number of pending cases but also because it has a bearing on the attitude and reflexes of the people under the most testing circumstances when their natural reactions compel them to act in a certain manner. 
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 based upon some credible evidence, and not totally fabricated. A person like the deceased who suffered from a prohibition under Qura'nic Injunctions not to touch or deal with a lady who was not Mehram to him could not so disgrace and insult as to evoke the corresponding duty of the husband to protect and guard the wife. Such a man under the Injunctions of Islam cannot be said to be Maasoom-ud?Dam when he is indulging in such an activity. Be it a person disgracing a lady or committing Zina?bil?Jabr with her being unmarried, it is not provocation but an exercise of the right conferred on the husband under the express words of the Qur'an itself. Qisas will not be liable in such a situation. Abdul Haque, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 31. It must be noted that this case was not one of grave and sudden provocation in the true sense, but rather one of defense of wife from an assault, which right was presumptively exceeded. 39 If this analysis were correct, the accused in an honor killing case ought to be acquitted rather than convicted for a different category of Qatl-i-Amd. This is because § §96, 97 and 100 read together state that "nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence" of one's "own body and the body of any other person," and this right extends to the voluntary causing of death . to the assailant if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be ... an assault with the intent of committing rape." It could, however, be argued that reasonable force short of causing death may be employed in order to prevent the com-It must, however, be noted that this was not a case of honor killing and the ratio of this case was rather limited. 40 The Court converted the petitioner's case from qatli-i-amd liable to qisas under Section 302(a) to qatli-i-amd liable to tazir under Section 302(b) and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Court reiterated the rule that if the conviction is based upon a confessional statement, then it must be taken in its entirety. As such, the Court held that if an accused makes a statement admitting the fact of intentional killing but maintains that he did so under grave and sudden provocation, this statement would not qualify as a 'confession' that would render the case one of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas.
1
On January 28, 2006, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decided Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad. 42 The accused claimed that he had killed the deceased under grave and sudden provocation upon seeing him and his wife "lying on the same bed in an objectionable position. ' 43 The trial court had convicted the accused under the old Section 304, Part I, without realizing that this provision was no longer on the statute books, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for seven years. On appeal, Ausaf Ali Khan, J. of the Lahore High Court pointed out this error and noted that the Islamized provisions did not provide an exception in cases of provocation, but held, nonetheless, that the accused had raised a valid defense. He based this judgment on the Islamic law doctrine of the sanctity of home: mission of zina (consensual sexual intercourse) with a woman under one's protection (in the above sense) since that is a serious crime under Islamic law. Honor killing situations then become comparable to those situations where the right of private defense of person is exceeded. Note that the old Exception 2 of §300 which stated:
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation... Simply, this is another way of reintroducing provocation and other old specific exceptions to murder through the back door. 40 The petitioner had killed the deceased in a courtroom during the trial of the deceased for the murder of the petitioner's father. The deceased had abused the petitioner by saying that he would rape his wife and all the women of his tribe if he were acquitted. The Court found that such abuse "was traditionally beyond toleration of a Pathan." 41 Abdul Haque, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 1 at 34. 42 Ali Muhammad, P.L.D. 1996 S.C. 274. 43 Id. at 278.
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And to enter a house without permission at night and commit Zina with wife/daughter/sister of owner of a house was obviously a vice which could be stopped with force. . In fact Islam does extend the right to the aggressed to take life of the aggressor in such a situation."
Again relying upon verse 4:34 of the Qur'an, 45 the Lahore High Court further held that this right of defense of person was available not only to the woman's husband, but also to any other person "in whose lawful custody she is residing." 46 The court held that "the appellant as custodian of honor of his wife had the right to kill the deceased while he was engaged in sex act with his wife and he had not earned liability of Qisas or Tazir or even Diyat.
' ' 47 Thus, the accused was acquitted. The Supreme Court explained to the 'uninitiated' that no anomaly exists in the High Court's decision to equate provocation with self-defense. Citing numerous English precedents about provocation, the Supreme Court suggested that there lies a universal belief that the natural response for a man is to lose self-control upon seeing his wife in an adulterous situation, just as much as it is natural for a man to use force in self-defense. 4 The Court then pointed out that the issue surrounding the conformity of exceptions to murder with the injunctions of Islam had been taken up by the Federal Shariat Court in the case of Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Government, prior to its decision in Gul Hassan Khan. 49 In that case, Aftab Hussain, Member, averred in his leading opinion that the exceptions to Section 300 did "not present any difficulty in respect of reconciliation with Quran and Sunnah. ' 
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mad Karam Shah, J., including Nasim Hassan Shah, J.,52 and Maulana Muhammad Taqi Usmani's opinion was a minority view. The Supreme Court thereby suggested that the exclusion of the exceptions to Section 300 from the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance of 1990, was an oversight and held that "there should be no doubt that the cases covered by the exceptions to the old section 300, P.P.C. read with the old section 304 thereof, are cases which were intended to be dealt with under clause (c) of the new section 302 of the P.P.C." 53 Hence, the court finally clarified and distinguished the sub-clauses for this seemingly redundant provision. Cases of honor killing which meet the test of grave and sudden provocation no longer fall under Section 302(a) or (b) but, instead, are now converted into cases covered by Section 302(c). Since Section 302(c) does not specify a minimum punishment, the courts were granted the freedom to revert to their pre-1990 approach. Even in the instant case, the Supreme Court reawakened the specter of Kamal v. State and held that the length of imprisonment already served by the accused, approximately three years, would suffice.
V. CRIMINAL LAW (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2004
After Pakistan gained considerable notoriety amongst the international media on account of its failure to curb murders in the name of honor, constant pressure from women's rights groups and human rights "watchdogs", substantial public debate and political wrangling, the Parliament finally passed a legislative measure to address these issues. The measure was enacted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2004, effective the fourth of January 2005. The Act introduced a number of potentially significant changes to the laws relating to murder. First, the Act has barred accused persons from becoming an heir (wali) of the victim in the case of murder committed "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '54 This provision is ostensibly designed to ensure that the offender does not grant himself pardon for his own crime. However, in reality, it is likely to have a very limited impact since only one wali's waiver of qisas is needed to save the accused from the death penalty, and in most cases of honor killing, there is at least one family member who is willing to forgive. Second, the Act has 66 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 increased the maximum punishment of Qatl-i-Amd not liable to qisas, punishable under Section 308 from fourteen to twenty-five years. 55 Again, this provision is unlikely to have an impact since in such cases of intra-family murders, judges do not exercise their discretion to award tazir punishment. If, in addition to increasing the maximum penalty a minimum sentence had also been specified for honor killings, then this provision would be more meaningful. Third, Section 311 of the P.P.C. has been amended such that the definition of fasad-fil-arz has been enlarged to include murder committed "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '56 In this respect, the maximum tazir penalty that a court may award after the waiver of qisas in cases of Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas, punishable under Section 302(a), has also been increased to death or life imprisonment, in addition to imprisonment for up to fourteen years as was previously the case. 57 This, by itself, will achieve little since our judges are unlikely to give such serious penalties after qisas has been waived. A more significant change, however, is that the provision mandates a minimum penalty of imprisonment of ten years as tazir for Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas, after waiver of qisas, if the crime has been committed "in the name or on the pretext of honour. ' '58 A similar approach has been adopted by setting a minimum penalty of ten years for attempted murder. 59 Finally, and of most importance, the Act has added a proviso to Section 302(c) to the effect that that clause would not apply to any murder committed "in the name or on the pretext of honor. '60 This provision is partially intended to undo Ali Muhammad and, thereby, deny the defense of grave and sudden provocation in cases of honor killing.
However, certain shortcomings in the 2004 Act may potentially unravel any ameliorative impact that it may have. The critics of the Act decried its failure to deny the options of waiver of qisas, pardon, or compoundability to the family members of the victim and the culprit in honor killing cases. 61 It was proposed that the state ought to be the heir in honor killing cases so that all prosecution decisions would be under the state's control. 62 But, the drafters of the Act chose a different methodology for resolving the problem -to specify mandatory minimum penaltieswhich was likely to be more apt to both sides of this divided issue. Unfortu- 
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nately, this approach has not been consistently adopted. Whereas a minimum penalty of ten years has been mandated for Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas, if committed in an honor killing scenario, no mandatory minimum sentence has been specified for Qatl-i-Amd not liable to qisas. Qatl-i-Amd liable to tazir already has a minimum penalty of life imprisonment, and arguably the mandatory minimum for Qatl-i-Amd liable to qisas and Qatl-i-Amd not liable to qisas, when committed in the name of honor, ought to be life imprisonment as well. Further, as already noted, the Act seeks to deny the defense of grave and sudden provocation in honor killing cases, by banning its conversion into a Section 302(c) offense. Perhaps a more consistent approach would have been to specify a minimum penalty for this offense, comparable to those specified for other categories of Qatl-i-Amd. The most disturbing shortcoming of this Act is its definition of honor killing. The Act defines honor killing as an offense "committed in the name or on the pretext of honor," meaning an offense "committed in the name or on the pretext of karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs or practices. '63 This may be narrowly interpreted to mean that those crimes covered by the provisions of this Act are only those that are committed in accordance with notorious customary practices, pursuant to decisions of tribal councils, and with planning and premeditation. Such a narrow definition would undermine the attempted exclusion of the defense of grave and sudden provocation, and reduce the minimum penalty provisions, thereby taking the vast majority of honor killings outside the scope of the Act. 64 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSISTENT ADHERENCE
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BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14 or to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two additional years in the instance that the offender has defaulted on such payment. The prosecution had alleged that the petitioner and his brother had ambushed the two victims and open-fired upon them. The motivation of this double-murder was stated to be the dishonor caused to the petitioner's family by the illicit relationship between one of the victims and the petitioner's daughter. In his defense, the petitioner did not deny his role in the incident, but contended that he had lost his self control due to grave and sudden provocation upon hearing that his daughter had been raped by the deceased. 66 The Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal stating that even if the petitioner's version was fully believed, intervention would not be justified:
The commission of an offence due to Ghairat or family honour must be differentiated from the grave and sudden provocation in consequence to which crime is committed in the light of facts and circumstances of each case. The plea of grave and sudden provocation may not be available to an accused who having taken plea of Ghairat and family honour, committed the crime with premeditation.
67
As such, the court drew a distinction between honor killing and grave and sudden provocation that dates back to its pre-1990 jurisprudence. In essence, the Court defined honor killing as those murders which are committed coolly and with premeditation. 68 It also implied that if murder is committed in the name of honor, but without premeditation, it will continue to fall within the purview of the doctrine of grave and sudden provocation. If this approach is followed to its logical conclusion, this vicious circle will repeat itself twice within the short span of less than two decades.
